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Abstract
We present a model incorporating both social and economic components, and
analyze their interaction. The notion of a social asset, an attribute that has value
only because of the social institutions governing society, is introduced. In the basic
model, agents match on the basis of income and unproductive attributes. An at-
tribute has value in some equilibrium social institutions (matching patterns), but
not in others. We then show that productive attributes (such as education) can
have their value increased above their inherent productive value by some social
institutions, leading to the notion of the social value of an asset.
Keywords: Social assets, social capital, social arrangements, nonmarket inter-
actions, social norms.
JEL Classi…cation: D20, D31, D5, J41, Z13.
1. Introduction
Nearly all economic decisions have a social component. Individuals care about social
characteristics such as status, honor, or popularity. Even when individuals only care
about “economic” variables, the nature of interactions that facilitate economic activity
are themselves at least partially social in nature. This social “context” must be taken
into account when studying many economic problems. Ifstatus, honor or popularity are
important to an individual, predictions about labor market responseto taxes or bonuses
that ignoretheseconsiderations will beless accuratethanpredictionsthat consider these
factors.
In this paper, we continue our interest (begun in Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite
(1992) and Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1998)) in understanding the impact of
¤We thank the National Science Foundation (under grant SES-0095768) for research support and
Hanming Fang, the participants at numerous presentations, and two anonymous referees for helpful
comments.economic considerations on the social environment. These papers, which focused on
equilibrium social institutions with personalized enforcement mechanisms, investigate
social norms that solve social dilemmas in the presence of incentives for opportunistic
behavior. In these social institutions, an individual who violated the accepted norms of
behavior is “punished” (in an incentive compatible way).1
Social institutions can also a¤ect the value of assets without the use of personalized
enforcement. More speci…cally, since there is a range of possible social institutions, as-
sets no longer need have a value independent of governing institutions. Since di¤erent
social institutions can create di¤erent incentives for a variety of economically relevant
behaviors and decisions, assets that have little (or no) value under some social institu-
tions may have positive value under others. The qualitative nature of these incentives
di¤er from those that arise with personalized enforcement, and give rise to the social
value of an asset. An agent may have a number of assets, the possession of which lead
to higher utility than would be possible without them. Examples include both alienable
assets that can be transferred to other people, such as machines or money, and inalien-
able assets that cannot be transferred — human capital. For a …xed set of preferences
and technology, an asset may or may not have productive value. A machine that can
produce radios and a bel canto (“beautiful singing”) voice both have productive value.
Other assets have no direct productive value, yet their possession may lead to higher
utility. For example, it may be that in a particular society agents with lighter skin
or a particular accent enjoy higher consumption than those with darker skin or a less
desirable accent, even when those attributes have no productive value per se. We refer
to an attribute of an agent that has value only becauseofa social institution as a social
asset. The social value of an asset is that part of an asset’s value that stems from the
social institutions, that is, the part of the value beyond that attributable to the asset’s
productive value.
We introduce a model that combines both the social and the traditional economic
aspects of society in a manner that allows for an analysis of the interaction between the
social environment and agents’ decisions. We consider a generational model in which
men and women match and have children. Incomeis random and nonstorable, men and
women match, and then jointly consumetheirincome. People get utility from their own
consumption and their descendants’ consumption. An individual’s sole decision is the
identity of his or her partner.
Since consumption is joint, a wealthier partner leads to higher consumption. There
will then be equilibria in which each person’s wealth determines his or her match. In
addition to equilibria of this kind, there may be additional equilibria in which nonpro-
ductiveattributesa¤ect matching. In particular, in equilibrium, attributes that have no
fundamental value can have instrumental value. Individuals care about their children’s
1We discuss this work in more detail in Section 7.
2consumption, which depends on the children’s (random) income. We assume it is not
possible to insure against this risk. There are thus two reasons why outcomes are not
fully e¢cient: parents would like to insure against the consumption risk their children
face, and rich parents would like to transfer consumption to their children, neither of
which is possible. This allows the possibility that social institutions may arise that
ameliorate the resulting ine¢ciency.
Suppose there is a heritable attribute that is independent of income, blue eyes for
example, and suppose further the attribute does not enter people’s utility functions.
Suppose, nevertheless, that in thissociety peoplewith blueeyes areconsidered desirable
mates, that is, that people are willing to match with a person who has blue eyes with
slightly less income than with a person without blue eyes. In such a society, people will
naturally prefertheirchildren to haveblueeyessince, all elseequal, they consumemore.
But if they prefer children with blue eyes, and blue eyes are a heritable attribute, they
will naturally prefer mates with blue eyes. In other words, a preference for blue eyes
may be self-ful…lling. Notice that this has nothing to do with any intrinsic desirability
for blue eyes; within this same society it could equally well have been that brown eyes
were a desirable attribute. Any heritable attribute might serve as a social asset in this
way.2
If the social institutions makeblueeyes a desirableattribute, we see that the degree
of assortativeness of matching on wealth is decreased relative to the case that matching
is on wealth alone. When there is no such desirable attribute, wealthy men match only
with wealthy women and vice versa. When the social institutions value an attribute
such as blue eyes, some wealthy short people match with less wealthy people with blue
eyes. The consequence of social institutions that value such assets is that the variance
of consumption in society is lower. When people are risk averse, the social institutions
that value attributes that are fundamentally extraneous can be welfare superior to
institutions that ignoresuch extraneousattributes. Separately from theinsurancevalue,
theattributealso allows a wealthy parent to transmit something ofvalueto hiso¤spring.
This is desirable from a parent’s point of view if the child’s expected wealth is lower
than the parent’s, whether the child’s wealth is risky or not.
The discussion above focuses on the case in which the attribute is nonproductive,
that is, the attribute is completely independent of anything that enters directly into
2The role of a social asset here is reminiscent of that of …at money in a model of exchange. There
are however, several important di¤erences. First, the social asset (attribute) is inalienable. A child who
inherits this asset cannot dispose of it; the only use the attribute can be put to is the “purchase” of a
higher income mate than would otherwise be the case. Second, the child who inherits the asset cannot
capture the full value of the asset, as he or she must bequeath the asset on to their o¤spring. In a sense
the individual who inherits the attribute captures the present ‡ow of value from it, but is unable to
capture any of the future value.
This story also has some similarities with theories of sexual selection that explain, for example,
peacock tails (see Ridley (1993, Chapter 5)). We discuss the relationship in Section 7.
3peoples’ utility functions. An analogous situation can arise for productive attributes.
Supposethat height istheattributeinquestion, and that it hasaproductivecomponent;
forexample, a tall personmay beableto reach thetop shelvesin a storagecloset without
getting a ladder, thereby being able to do sometasks more quickly than a short person.
In such a scenario, height leads to a higherexpected income. All people would naturally
prefer tall partners in such a world, even if height did not enter directly into utility
functions, since people would realize that the children they have with tall partners are
more likely to have high income.
Even when the attribute has a productive component, it still may be possible to
identify a social component of its value. Since it is productive, people will prefer part-
ners with the attribute to those without, all other things equal. But if the productive
advantage is small, there may betwo stablematchings corresponding to thosedescribed
above for the unproductive attribute case. One will have high income people without
the attribute matching with like partners, and a second will have high income people
without the attribute matching with low income people with the attribute. The situa-
tion is as before: it may be that the social institutions in the society are such that if
others in society value the attribute above and beyond its productive value, then it is
rational for each individual to do so as well.
We emphasize that we view this model as a parable rather than a serious model of
marriage and investment in human capital. The model is designed to demonstrate how
the social and economic components of society interact and the role of social assets in
such a model. There are many models that accomplish these goals, and we chose the
particularly simple one described above for expository ease.3 The examples of social
assets in the description and motivation above were characteristics or traits that were
physically embodied in the individual such as accent or height. Some social assets may
have such a physical manifestation, but it isn’t necessary. For example, our conception
of an individual’s social assets includes the set of people that one knows personally.
Inthenext section, weformalizethemodel describedabove. In Section3 weconsider
the case where the characteristics appear in half the population and where the trans-
mission is “balanced” (so that the fraction with the characteristic is always a half). We
provide conditions under which there are equilibria with nontrivial social assets, and
we consider how such social assets can arise. We emphasized in the discussion above
that a central concern in this paper was the analysis of theinteraction between peoples’
decisions and thesocial environment. In Section 4 weanalyzehow thesocial institutions
within a society – that is, what assets have value – can endogenously change over time.
Attributes that are not genetically transmitted, but are rather passed from parents to
children socially, such as accents, manners, etc., are arguably even more important than
genetically transmitted characteristics. Section 5 treats this more general case. Lastly,
3An alternative, non-matching, model is discussed in Section 7.
4wedrop therestriction that individualscan only a¤ect their futureo¤springs’ chancesof
acquiring theattribute through the choice of a mate. Weextend our analysis in Section
6 to allow individuals access to a market to in‡uencethe chancetheir children will have
desirable attributes, such as education. We conclude with a discussion section.
2. Model
There is an in…nite sequence of two-period lived agents, each of which consists of a
continuum of men and women. There is a single non-storable consumption good. In
each period, old menand womenmatch andconsumetheir combined wealth (so that the
good is a public good within couples).4 In addition, each couple has two o¤spring (one
of each gender). The common consumption utility function for old agents is concave
and denoted U : < ! <. Individuals care about their descendants’ welfare: the utility
to any matched couple is their utility from consumption plus the discounted average
utility of their children, with common discount rate ﬂ. Thismeans, ofcourse, that their
utility depends on the consumption of all future generations.
While agents neither take actions nor receive utility in their …rst period of life, they
may acquire an attribute. Weassume (except in Section 6) that agents can only acquire
thisattributethroughtheirparents: both o¤spring will havetheattributeforsureifboth
parentspossess the attribute, they will surely not have it if neither haveit, and they will
haveit with probability ‰ ifoneparent hadtheattribute.5 Forsimplicity, weassumethat
either both o¤spring have the attribute, or neither does. Individuals with the attribute
are y agents, while those without the attribute are n agents. This attribute does not
enter into agents’ utility functions. Education is an especially interesting attribute; we
consider this attribute in Section 6, and allow parents to expend resources to increase
the likelihood of their children having this attribute. At present, however, we assume
the transmission is exogenous.
Each agent receives an endowment of the consumption good (income) at the begin-
ning of their second period of life. This income is either high (H) or low (L). The
attribute is possibly productive: the probability that a y agent has high income (H) is
1
2 +k, and the probability an n agent has high income is 1
2 ¡k, k ¸ 0. The productivity
of the attribute is captured by k; if k = 0, the attribute is nonproductive, and agents
are equally likely to have high or low income.
We assume an agent’s income is independent of the parents’ incomes. Possible
consumption levels for matched pairs are 2H; 2L and H +L: We normalize the utility
4The critical implication of the assumption that consumption is joint is that agents prefer richer
partners, all else equal. We can allow for some private consumption, as long as this implication holds.
5Our model of attribute transmission is identical to the vertical transmission model of Cavalli-Sforza
and Feldman (1981); they, however, do not consider the incentives agents have to match with di¤erent
partners.
5function so that U(2L) = 0 and U(2H) =1, and denote the utility ofthe third possible
consumption level, H +L; by u; u2 [1
2; 1) since U is concave. An agent’s income level
and thepresence/absenceoftheattributetogetherconstitutethat agent’scharacteristic.
The only decision an agent makes in this economy (except in Section 6) concerns
matching. A proposed matching is stable if no pair of agents can increase each of their
utilities by matching, taking into account the consequences for their descendants (Roth
and Sotomayer (1990)).6 Any matching induces a matching on agent characteristics in
the obvious manner. A matching is strictly stable if, for each unmatched pair of agent
characteristics, agents with these characteristics would strictly decrease their utilities
by matching (taking into account the consequences for their descendants).




is the distribution of
attributes in the economy („y is the fraction of men, and of women, with the attribute,
and „n = 1¡„y), and m is the matching. Given „, the distribution of characteristics
is determined by the productivity of the attribute, so that, for example, the fraction
of the population with high income and the attribute is (1
2 +k)„y. An equilibrium is




t=0; where „t, the distribution of attributes in period t, is
induced from thedistribution of characteristics and matching in period t¡1, and where
thematching ineach period isstable. Notethat thisnotionofequilibriumisanonymous.
Parents can only a¤ect the utility of their children through the characteristics they
receive.
3. A Special Case
In this section and the next, we analyze the case where half the population has the
attributeand transmission isbalanced, i.e., ‰ = 1
2. Thiscaseisrelatively straightforward
to analyze for two reasons. First, with balanced transmission, the proportion of the
population that has the attribute is independent of the matching. As a consequence, to
analyze equilibrium, it is enough to describe the stable matchings. Second, when half
thepopulation has theattribute, the mixed matching is particularly simple, since all the
Hn’s match with all the Ly’s. When the fraction of the population with the attribute
is di¤erent from a half, there is rationing in the mixed matching, and the calculations
become more complicated; we analyze this case in Section 5.
3.1. Stable Assortative Matching
If the attribute is unproductive, and the distribution over o¤spring characteristics is
independent of parents’ characteristics, any matching positively assortative on income
6Since there are no side payments, a matching will only be destabilized if both deviating agents
strictly prefer to match.
6will clearly be stable. If theattributeis productive, a matching that is positive assorta-
tive on income but not on attribute cannot be stable (since an Hy agent can do better
by matching with another Hy agent than with an Hn agent). Theassortative matching
has high income men match with high incomewomen andmen with theattribute match
with women with the attribute:
Men Women
Hy Ã ! Hy
Hn Ã ! Hn
Ly Ã ! Ly
Ln Ã ! Ln
It will be convenient to work with average discounted value functions. If an agent
has discount factor ﬂ, the average discounted value of the stream of utilities fvtg1
t=1 is P1
t=1 ﬂt¡1(1¡ﬂ)vt. By rescaling ‡ow utility by the factor (1¡ﬂ), a constant sequence
of ‡ow utility v has average discounted value of v.
Denote by V A
y the average discounted value function for agents who have the at-
tribute when matching is assortative, evaluated before their income has been realized,
and by VA
n the value function of those who do not have the attribute. Note that while
matching occurs after income is realized, since matching is assortative on attribute as
well as income, if an agent has the attribute, then s/he will match with a partner who
also has the attribute, and so their o¤spring has the attribute with probability 1. The

































The value of having the attribute in this equilibrium is VA
y ¡ VA
n = 2k, which is the
‡ow value of the productivity of the attribute.
Consider now an Hn agent. If he or she matches according to the prescribed as-
sortative matching, the resulting utility will be 1 ¡ ﬂ +ﬂV A
n , since such a matching
7yields for sure children without the attribute. If this agent matches instead with an
Ly agent, he or she gives up some current consumption utility, but has the chance of





and consequently he or she would prefer to match with an Ly agent if





n ) = ﬂk:















Hence, thematching that is perfectly assortative on income and attributes is not stable





As we indicated at the beginning ofthis section, it isclear that assortativematching
is stable when the attribute is unproductive (k = 0). But the matching is also stable
when the attribute is very productive (k > u(1¡ﬂ)=ﬂ). In this case, an Ly agent
wouldn’t want to match with an Hn agent, since the income gain is worth less than the
expected sacri…ce in terms of the matching prospects of the o¤spring. Here in a sense,
matching is driven primarily by the attribute, and only secondarily by income.
Note also that if u < 1
2 (i.e., agents are risk-loving), then (3.1) must always be
violated. In order for the assortative matching to fail to be stable, not only must a
high income agent without an attribute be willing to give-up some current utility for
thepossibility of o¤spring with the attribute, but a low incomeagent with theattribute
must be willing to sacri…ce future utility since the o¤spring may, as a result, not have
the attribute.
It is clear that agents with the characteristic Hy never have an incentive to deviate,
while Ln agents can never induce a matching from agents with other characteristics.
Thus, we have the following proposition.





83.2. Stable Mixed Matching
The second interesting matching is the mixed matching:
Men Women
Hy Ã ! Hy
Hn Ã ! Ly
Ly Ã ! Hn
Ln Ã ! Ln
As in the assortative matching, Hy’s match with Hy’s and Ln’s match with Ln’s,
but unlike that matching, Hn’s match with Ly’s. The question of stability of this
mixed matching immediately arises when the attribute is unproductive: Why would
an Hn give up current consumption by matching with an Ly, who contributes less
to current consumption than an Hn? Clearly, if the discount factor ﬂ is 0, that is,
if parents care only about their personal consumption, mixed matching is not stable:
two Hn agents would have higher utility by matching together than they would have
if they followed the prescribed matching, whether or not other agents follow the mixed
matching prescriptions.
However, if parents care about their children, there is a bene…t to an Hn who
matches with an Ly when all other agents are following theprescribed mixed matching.
An Hn’s o¤spring will have the attribute with probability 1
2 when matched with an
Ly, but with probability 0 if he or she matches with another Hn. While the possession
of this attribute doesn’t a¤ect the child’s income, it does a¤ect who they will match
with. An Ly child will match with a high income agent (Hn), while an Ln child
matches with an Ln: Consequently, if other agents are following the prescriptions of
mixed matching, the attribute has value in a¤ecting o¤springs’ matching prospects
(and, a fortiori, consumption prospects) even when theattribute is nonproductive. The
fact that the attribute has value because of its a¤ect on matching doesn’t ensure that
the mixed matching is stable of course. Stability will be determined by the trade-o¤
that an Hn faces between the lower current consumption that matching with an Ly
entails and the expected bene…t it will confer on his or her o¤spring.
The value functions for agents with and without the attribute are denoted VM
y and
V M
n (the superscript M denotes mixed matching). An agent with the attribute has
income H with probability (1
2 +k); under mixed matching this agent then matches with
an identical agent, jointly consumes 2H, and has o¤spring who inherit the attribute
with probability 1. An agent with the attribute has income L with probability (1
2 ¡k)
and, under mixed matching, matches with an Hn agent. Jointly they consume H +L,
and their o¤spring inherit the attribute with probability 1
2. Thus, VM













































For the mixed matching to be stable, an Hn agent must prefer to match with an
Ly agent rather than match with another Hn agent, and an Ly agent must prefer to
match with an Hn agent rather than with another Ly agent. The incentive constraint






n ) ¸1 ¡ﬂ +ﬂV M
n : (3.5)






n ) ¸ﬂV M
y :
Combining these inequalities, a necessary and su¢cient condition for the mixed match-






n ) ·u(1¡ﬂ): (3.6)
Rearranging the inequality and using (3.4), we have the following proposition.






The polar case in which the attribute has no productive value, k = 0, is of particular
interest. The corresponding condition for mixed matching to be an equilibrium when





10Figure 3.1: For any ﬂ, if u is above the curved line, mixed matching will be stable.
Since u ¸ 1
2; the second inequality is satis…ed for all ﬂ 2 [0;1]. Hence, a su¢cient






Figure3.1 illustratesthecombinationsofuand ﬂ forwhich mixedmatchingis stable.
Recall that the assortative matching is necessarily stable in the case that the at-
tribute is unproductive. Thus, in the unproductive attribute case, there are multiple
stable matchings when this inequality is satis…ed.
These two matchingshave di¤erent economicconsequences. Forthecaseofbalanced
transmission, the number of agents with the attribute is independent of the matching,
and hence, the distribution of income in the society is independent of the social insti-
tutions: half of the society has income H and half has L. However, since consumption
within couples is joint, di¤erent matchings may lead to di¤erent distributions of con-
sumption. That the distribution of consumption di¤ers for the two stable matchings
described above is clear. Under assortative matching, high incomeagents always match
with high income, and hence, half of the people consume 2H, while the other half con-
sume2L: Ontheother hand, inthemixed matching, halfofthelow incomepeople(those
with the attribute) match with high income agents (thehigh incomepeoplewithout the
attribute). Hence, only a quarter of the people consume 2H, a quarter consume 2L,
11and the remaining half consume H +L.
We now argue that mixed matching Pareto dominates assortative matching when
the mixed matching is stable. The binding incentive constraint for the mixed matching
to be stable is given by (3.5): an Hn agent prefers to match with an Ly agent rather
than match with another Hn agent in this period, assuming that his o¤spring follow the
mixed matching. Since the environment is stationary, this constraint is equivalent to
the constraint that an Hn agent prefers to follow the mixed matching rather than have
all his Hn o¤spring as well as himself match with Hn agents. This latter behavior is
almost assortative matching by the Hn agent and his descendants (since the matching
behavior of Hy and Ln agents in the mixed and assortative matchings agree). Assorta-
tive matching di¤ers in that the Ly descendants are matching with Hn agents, while in
the assortative matching they match with Ly agents. Consider now the payo¤ implica-
tions of all Ly descendants matching with Ly agents rather than with Hn agents (when
descendants of the other characteristics, Hy, Hn, and Ln, match assortatively). Since
the descendants with the other characteristics are ignoring the attribute in matching,
this change must lower payo¤s. Hence, an agent with characteristic Hn must (weakly)
prefer the mixed matching to the assortative matching, when the mixed is stable. This
then impliesthat an agent with characteristicLy also (weakly) prefers themixed match-
ing to the assortative matching, when the mixed is stable. (By the above argument,
such an agent’s payo¤ is reduced if all his Hn descendants match assortatively, and
reduced even further when all Ly descendants, including himself, match assortatively).
Thisthen impliesthat agents with characteristics Hy and Ln (weakly) preferthe mixed
matching to the assortative matching.
It is straightforward to verify by direct computation of the value functions that the
converseisalso true(seetheappendix). We summarizethisin thefollowing proposition.
Proposition 3 Suppose the attribute is unproductive (k = 0). The mixed matching
(weakly) Pareto dominates the assortative matching if and only if the mixed matching
is stable, i.e., inequality (3.8) holds.
The interpretation is straightforward. Higher u corresponds to a more concave
utility function over consumption. As in most models similar to ours, the concavity
of the utility function is doing double duty, both representing agents’ attitude toward
risk and their rate of intertemporal substitution. To the extent that more concave
utility functions re‡ect higher risk aversion, the value of the insurance associated with
the asset has higher value. Treating concavity as measuring the rate of intertemporal
substitution, more concave utility functions increase the bene…t to a high income agent
of transferring consumption to his child. In both ways, more concave utility functions
are associated with a greater valueof theasset. For a …xed ﬂ, ifagents’ utility functions
are su¢ciently concave, regardless of income, agents obtain higher utility under mixed
12matching than under assortative matching.
3.4. The Emergence of Mixed Matching
While the mixed matching on an unproductive attribute is welfare superior when it
is stable, it is natural to ask how or why a society might end up with a matching
that depends on nonproductive characteristics. Here we brie‡y outline one possibility:
the attribute was at one time productive, and its productivity initially requires mixed
matching for stability. At a later time, the attribute is no longer productive, and
consequently, matching that ignores the attribute may become stable. Nonetheless, the
existing mixed matching for which the attribute matters remains stable.
There is a simple intuition why matchings that don’t pair Ly agentswith Hn agents
may not be stable for with productive attributes (k > 0). When the attribute is su¢-
ciently productive, an Hn agent may …nd that the increase in expected income for his
o¤spring more than compensates for the decrease in current consumption independent
of any change in matching prospects that might also ensue.
We now argue that there are con…gurations of k, ﬂ, and u for which (3.7), (3.8),
and (3.1) all hold. Recall that (3.8) is equivalent to 1 ¡ u · ﬂ=[2(2 ¡ﬂ)]. Fix k <




















Thus, by choosing u large enough all three inequalities will be satis…ed.
Consideraworld inwhichtheattributeisproductive(with parameterk), and that all
three inequalities are satis…ed. Suppose that in every period there is a small probability
p that the attribute becomes unproductive. If p is su¢ciently small, the matching must
be mixed in every equilibrium before the attribute becomes unproductive. Moreover,
after the attribute becomes unproductive, the mixed matching remains stable. One
can interpret this as an explanation as to how nonproductive attributes can be valued.
They once had productive value, and the environment was such that matching must
take this attribute into account. The eventual disappearance of the productiveness of
the attribute does not upset the stability of the mixed matching.7
7Under the con…guration of the parameters for which(3.7), (3.8), and (3.1) all hold, any equilibrium
must have mixed matching while the asset is productive. We focus on the equilibrium in which mixed
matching continues subsequent to the productivity change. There is, however, another equilibrium
in which the necessarily initially mixed matching when the asset is productive abruptly changes to
assortative matching when the asset becomes nonproductive.
134. Endogenously Changing Social Institutions
Oneofourprimary interestsisin how social institutionswithin a society can changeover
time. It is often suggested that within some societies, values do change through time,
evidencedby thecommon lament that “peoplejust don’t careabout thethingsthat used
to be important.” The analysis above showed that in the unproductive attribute case,
both assortativeand mixed matching can be stable for some values of the parameters u
and ﬂ: One could simply assert that the change in values is captured by a switch from
one equilibrium matching to another, but there are objections to this approach.
First, we would like the change in norms in a society to be endogenous, that is,
we would like the change to arise from the underlying characteristics of the society.
Explanationsthat simply assumethat a society switchesfromoneequilibriumtoanother
rely on explanationsthat areoutsidethemodel. Sincetheexplanations don’t comefrom
the model itself, they provide no insight into why the change took place.
A second objection is less conceptual but more serious. For a matching to be stable,
there is an incentive constraint that no unmatched pair ofagents would prefer to match
rather than follow the suggested matching. The calculations in the determination of
the incentive constraints assume the matching is permanent. If agents understand that
the matching may change in the future, this should be incorporated into the incentive
constraints if we wish to maintain our assumption that agents are fully rational.
More concretely, in the mixed matching, Hn agents prefer to match Ly’s. An Hn is
trading o¤ thepresent period utility cost ofnot matching with anotherHn(and getting
higher consumption) with the bene…t of matching with an Ly (and getting a positive
probability of o¤spring with the desirable attribute, which will assure those o¤spring
higher consumption). The higher expected consumption of o¤spring that compensates
for the immediate lower consumption is less valuable if there is a chance that future
generations will not “honor” the claim to higher consumption expected for agents with
attribute y.
Our approach is to construct an equilibrium in which the matching speci…cation is
stochastic, with the change in matching arising from changes in the environment. The
basic idea is that, as we showed above, the possibility that a mixed matching is stable
depends on the relationship between u and ﬂ. The discount factor ﬂ is …xed, but we
introduce income growth into the basic model. A high income agent who matches with
a low income agent has lower utility from consumption than if he or she had matched
with another high income agent. The utility di¤erence, however, will generally depend
on the two income levels. If there is rising income, the “risk premium” an agent will
pay to ameliorate the riskiness in futuregenerations’ consumption may decrease. Ifthis
risk premium does decrease, it may destabilizemixed matching. Weillustratenext how
this may occur in equilibrium. For simplicity, the discussion in this section is con…ned
to the case of unproductive attributes.
14We maintain the two-point income distribution analyzed above, but allow the pos-
sibility of a one-time income increase that occurs at a random time.8 (Any change in
the income process occurs at the end of a period after matching and before the next
period’s income is realized; the change is assumed to becommon knowledge.) As above,
there are initially two income levels, L < H. In each period, with probability p, the
income levels increase from (L; H) to (ﬁL;ﬁH), ﬁ> 1. Once the higher income level is
reached, it remains at that level permanently.
This particular income growth process preserves relative incomes; only the level
changes. If the utility function U exhibits constant relative risk aversion, the incentive
constraint for stability of the mixed matching will be satis…ed at the initial income
level if and only if it is satis…ed at the higher level.9 This implies that if we introduce
stochasticincomegrowth as abovewith p su¢ciently small, themixedmatching remains
stable.
Suppose, however, that the utility function U exhibits decreasing relative risk aver-
sion. In this case the risk premium associated with the random consumption of future
generations will be smaller after the incomeincrease than before, and the incentivecon-
straint requiring a type Hnto prefer matching with a type Ly to matching withanother
Hn may not be satis…ed after the income increase. If this is the case, only assortative
matching will be stable after the income increase.
Can it be the case that prior to the income increase the mixed matching can be
stable? As mentioned, we maintain rational expectations in the sense that prior to the
income increase, the mixed matching must be stable when the agents know that there
is a chance that thenorm will break down in any period, and hence, that it must break
down eventually. Recall that a matching is strictly stable if, for each unmatched pair
of agent characteristics, agents with these characteristics would strictly decrease their
utilities by matching (taking into account the consequences for their descendants).
Proposition 4 Suppose the attribute is unproductive, the mixed matching is strictly
stable for income levels (L; H), and is not stable for (ﬁL; ﬁH). Suppose income levels
begin at (L; H), and in each period there is a probability p of a permanent increase to
(ﬁL;ﬁH). There exists ¹ p >0 such that for p 2 (0; ¹ p), it is an equilibrium for matching
to be mixed while income is at the level (L;H), and for it to be assortative once income
increases to (ﬁL; ﬁH).
Proof. We denote by VM
i (ﬁ), i 2 fHy; Hn;Ly;Lng, the value functions for the
agents of each type under mixed matching when incomes start at the level (L;H) and
8We discuss the possibility of perpetually increasing incomes below.
9To see this, note that a constant relative risk aversion utility function is either U(x) = cx
￿; or
U(x) = lnx. In the …rst case, U(ﬁx) = ﬁ
￿U(x), while in the second U(ﬁx) = lnﬁ+lnx. In either case,
it is straightforward that the relevant inequalities are identical.
15in any period there is a probability p that incomes increase to (ﬁH; ﬁL), and matching
changes to assortative matching at that time (with complementary probability, incomes
do not increase and matching remains mixed). Denote by V A
i (p), i 2 fH;Lg, the value
functions under assortative matching with thehigher incomes, (ﬁH; ﬁL). The equations
for the initial value functions VM
t (p) are
VM
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Since the assortative matching value functions are bounded, as p ! 0, each value
function V M
t (ﬁ) converges to the value function V M
t (0), that is, the value functions
calculated in the previous section. Hence, since the incentive constraint for the case
in which income is unchanging is satis…ed with strict inequality, for su¢ciently low
probability p, it will besatis…ed for the case in which incomes increase with probability
p.
To summarize: if at the initial income levels, the mixed matching is stable with
a strict inequality in the incentive constraint, and if at the increased income level the
incentive constraint is not satis…ed, there will be an equilibrium in which matching is
based on the mixed matching until incomes increase, at which point the matching must
change to the income only ranking.
We can easily generalize this observation to perpetually (stochastically) increasing
incomes. In each period there are two income levels. In the …rst period, theincomes are
H1 = H and L1 = L: In period t, the incomes are (ﬁtH; ﬁtL), ﬁt ¸ 1. As before, the
relative wealth levels stay the samebut the incomes grow overtime. Theincomefactors
ﬁt arestochastic with ﬁt = ﬁt¡1 with probability 1¡p 2 (0;1); and ﬁt =ﬁt¡1 +￿ with
probability p.10 Suppose that the utility function U exhibits decreasing relative risk
10We assume that the increases in income, ￿, do not depend on the period or the current income level
for expositional ease only. We could allow the size of the increases to depend on these without changing
any of the analysis as long as the increases are bounded above. Similarly, the probability that incomes
may rise at any time may depend on the period and the current income level; the constraint will be on
the maximum probability of an income change in any period.
16aversion. Then the value of the insurance to an Hn agent from a match with a high
attribute partner is decreasing, and the opportunity cost in terms of forgone current
consumption to obtain that insurance is increasing. If at some point, it is not su¢cient
to o¤set the immediate utility loss from consumption that results from a match with
an Ly agent, mixed matching is not stable, and matching will be assortative. However,
if the initial income levels are such that the incentive constraint for stability of mixed
matching is satis…ed with strict inequality, then for su¢ciently small p, there will be
an equilibrium characterized by mixed matching which will be stable as long as that
incentive constraint is satis…ed, and assortative matching after that. Furthermore, if
R(x) = ¡x
U00(x)
U0(x) ! 0 as x ! 0, then the incentive constraint for mixed matching will
eventually be violated with probability one.
This result can be interpreted as the sure eventual demise of social institutions that
depend on non-payo¤ relevant criteria when there is asymptotically vanishing relative
risk aversion. It is interesting to note that at the point at which the matching regime
changes, theremay beonly a small change intheincomedistribution, but a largechange
in the distribution ofconsumption. Under assortative matching, all high income agents
match with other high income people, while in mixed matching, half the high income
agents match with low income agents. The collapse of mixed matching is accompanied
by a large increase in the variance of consumption.
5. The General Case
We have thus far focussed on the special case where half the population always had the
attribute. We now extend our analysis to more general situations. This includes both
balanced transmission (where the probability of transmission in a couple in which one
parent has the attribute, ‰; equals one half) with nonuniform distribution of attributes
(i.e., „ =(„y; „n) 6=(1
2; 1
2)), aswell asunbalanced transmissionwhere‰ may bedi¤erent
from one half. For simplicity, we continue to assume the attribute is nonproductive.
Whenmatchingisassortative, eitherboth parentshavetheattribute, orbothparents
do not have the attribute. Consequently, the values of ‰ and „ are irrelevant, and the
fraction of the population that has the attribute is stationary. Moreover, when the
attribute is nonproductive, the assortative matching is stable.
When matching is mixed, on the other hand, thereare many matched pairs in which
only one parent has the attribute. Moreover, when „y 6= 1
2, there will be di¤erent
numbers of agents of characteristic Hn and Ly, so that the larger set is rationed. In
the mixed matching, all agents in the smaller group match with agents from the other
group, and the remaining agents from the larger group are matched with agents with
the same characteristics.
We calculate the di¤erence equation describing the evolution of the fraction of the
17population with theattribute for general ‰. Observe …rst that agents with theattribute
in period t, in proportion „t
y, are equally likely to have high income, H, or low income,
L. In terms of keeping track of „t, we can think of each agent being replaced by a
single child in the next period. Each agent with the attribute and income H will have
a child with the attribute, since the parent is matched with an agent who also has the
attribute: Hence, each Hy agent (in proportion 1
2„t
y) has a child with the attribute.
Similarly, Ln agents match with the same type and contribute no children with the
attribute the next period. If „t
y ¸ 1
2, there are more agents with the attribute than
without. Hence, there are fewer Hn agents than Ly agents. Consequently, all Hn
agents will be in mixed attribute matches, and this group will contribute 1
2„t
n‰ children
to the pool of agents with the attribute in the next period. The Ly agents who are
in mixed matches with an Hn agent also have probability ‰ of having a child with
the attribute, hence the contribution from this type to the pool of agents with the
attribute next period is 1
2„t
n‰. Finally, the Ly agents who do not match with Hn
agents (there are 1
2(„t
y ¡ „t
n) of these) will instead match with other Ly agents and
have a child with the attribute with probability 1. Summing over these, the proportion
















2, there are more
Hn agents than Ly agents, and so not all Hn agents match with an Ly. Only 1
2„t
y will
do so, and only these have the possibility of having a child with the attribute. Agents
with characteristic Ln match with agents of the same type and contribute no children
possessing attribute y in the next period. Hence the proportion of children with the
attribute in period t+1, „t+1
























We …rst consider the case ‰ = 1
2. Any fraction of the population with the attribute
is now clearly a steady state of the dynamic (5.1). We argued at the beginning of
Section 3.3 that inequality (3.8) was a necessary and su¢cient condition for the mixed
matching to be stable when „y = 1
2. An important consideration comes into play when
„y 6= 1
2: If thefraction with the attributeis too large, then an Ly cannot be guaranteed
a match with an Hn agent, lowering the value of having the attribute. Suppose „y > 1
2
and let ﬁ= „n=„y be the probability an Ly agent matches with an Hn agent (so that
with probability 1 ¡ﬁ, an Ly matches with another Ly). Then the value of having the
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Stability ofthemixed matching still requiresthat an Hn agent must prefer to match
with an Ly agent rather than match with another Hn agent, and an Ly agent must
prefer to match with an Hn agent rather than with another Ly agent. Consequently,
inequality (3.6) (with k = 0) is still the relevant condition. Not surprisingly, since the
attribute is not productive, an Ly agent always wants to match with an Hn agent,
irrespective of the value of ﬁ. This is not true of Hn agents. Simplifying (3.5) in this





whichis an increasingly severerestriction on uasﬁbecomes small (i.e., as„y approaches
1). Intuitively, if „y is too close to 1 (so that ﬁis close to 0), thematching with respect
to income is almost the same as in assortative matching. That is, nearly all Ly’s match
with agents of the sametype, in particularwith low incomeagents. Hence the di¤erence
between the expected utility for a child with the attribute and without is arbitrarily
small. There is little insurancevaluein having theattribute, so an Hn agent will prefer
tomatchwith anotherHn agent to matching with an Ly agent: That is, mixedmatching
is not stable.
A similar calculation for the case „y < 1
2 (where now Hn is rationed, while Ly is
not), shows that (3.8) is the relevant inequality for stability in this case (as it is when
„y = 1
2). The logic on Pareto dominance from Proposition 3 applies here as well, so we
have:
Proposition 5 Suppose k = 0 and ‰ = 1
2. If „y · 1
2, the mixed matching is stable if
and only if (3.8) holds. If „y > 1





Moreover, when the mixed matching is stable, it Pareto dominates assortative matching.
195.1. Unbalanced transmission
We now turn to unbalanced transmission of attributes, which does not preserve the
population fractions, i.e., ‰ 6= 1
2. There are two cases with very di¤erent properties,
corresponding to whether ‰ is smaller or larger than 1
2. If ‰ < 1
2, then both parents
having the attribute results in a more than proportionate increase in the probability
that o¤spring will have the attribute. Consequently, we say that we have economies of
scale in the transmission of the attribute. Conversely, if ‰ > 1
2, we have diseconomies
of scale.
An example of an attribute that displays economies of scale might be the ability
to converse intelligently. If both parents have this attribute, it will be passed on to
the children because of the social interactions that occur within the family, while if
only one parent has the attribute, then it may be less likely that the child acquires the
attribute. On the other hand, if the attribute is the ability to play the piano, it may
make little di¤erence in the probability that a child acquires the attribute whether one
or two parents possess the attribute.
When ‰ < 1
2, couples in which only one parent has the attribute have a less than
even chance of producing o¤spring with the attribute, the fraction of the population
with the attribute will decline. The value „ = 0 is the globally stable rest point of
(5.1). Moreover, in comparison with balanced transmission, the expected value of the
insurance received by matching with an Ly agent is reduced, since o¤spring have a
smaller probability of acquiring the attribute. Denote by ¹ „ the value of „y for which
(5.2) holds as an equality. We then have:
Proposition 6 Suppose ‰ < 1
2, k =0, and (3.8) holds strictly. For all „0
y 2 (0; ¹ „), there
exists ‰ 2 (0; 1
2) such that if ‰ 2 (‰; 1
2), then the mixed matching is stable. Moreover,
the fraction of the population with the attribute converges to 0 and the utility of the
representative agent in this matching converges to that of the representative agent in
the assortative matching.
The analysis is a straightforward variant of that above, and we simply discuss the
intuition for stability. Clearly if the probability of transmission, ‰, is too small, the
mixed attribute matching cannot be stable. An Hn can match with another Hn and
get higher utility from consumption, and the continuation payo¤s will be nearly the
same as if he matches with an Ly agent.
However, similarly to the stochastically increasing income case analyzed in the pre-
vious section, when ‰ is su¢ciently close to 1
2, the value functions will be nearly the
same as in the case with ‰ = 1
2: Thus, sincethe incentive constraint when ‰ = 1
2 is satis-
…ed with strict inequality (by assumption, (3.8) holds strictly), the analogous incentive
constraint will be satis…ed when ‰ is close to 1
2.
20Note that the proportion of agents with the attribute does not go to 0 under all
matchings. In particular, under the assortative matching (which guarantees that at-
tributes match with attributes), all children born to parents with the attribute will
have the attribute, and the proportion is unchanged over time.
We turn now to ‰ > 1
2, that is, the expected number of children with high attribute
coming from mixed matches (matches with exactly one parent with high attribute) is
greater than 1. In contrast to the case where ‰ < 1
2, now thevalue „ = 1 is the globally
stable rest point of (5.1) and so mixed matching is no longer stable.
Proposition 7 Suppose ‰ > 1
2 and k =0. The mixed matching is not stable.
In this case, asymptotically all agents possess the attribute, and we have already
seen that the mixed matching cannot be stable in this case.11 But then the prescribed
matching will “unravel,” that is, in the period prior to that in which the incentive
constraint is violated, no Hn will match with an Ly; and hence the same in the period
prior to this, and so on. In other words, mixed matching cannot be stable.
It is worth mentioning that it isinconsistent with equilibrium to have initially mixed
matching, and then at some time t (when „t
y has become su¢ciently close to 1) switch
to assortative matching. The large population means that the dynamics on the fraction
of the population with the attribute are deterministic, and so the last possible trigger
date is common knowledge. But then, as we have just argued, mixed matching will
break down in the previous period, and so on.
It is easy to see why mixed matching cannot be stable, since forward-looking agents
will seethat it cannot foreverbestable, henceit will unravel. Here, asin most unraveling
arguments, the unraveling is highly sensitive to particular features of the model. If it
were not common knowledge that the matching would unravel, it may be stable for
a long time and eventually break down in a manner analogous to the situation with
bubbles in …nite horizon rational expectations models. Similarly, we could have mixed
matching stable if there was a small stochastic component similar to that introduced in
the case of endogenously changing social institutions above.
6. Endogenous Attribute Choice
A central feature of the analysis above is that an attribute may have value in matching
both because it has direct productive value and because it has social value, that is,
because it enhances matching prospects. If the attribute is productive, agents who
possess the attribute are, of course, more attractive mates. While the productive value
11When k > 0, the fact that all agents asymptotically possess the attribute under mixed matching
does not necessarily ensure that mixed matching will be unstable. While the insurance value of the
asset asymptotically disappears in this case, it still has direct productive value.
21of the attribute is the same across di¤erent matching rules, the social value is not. If
there areinvestment opportunities availableto parents that can a¤ect the chances their
children will possess theattribute, the return to the investment will then depend on the
social institutions governing matching. Our aim in this section is to demonstrate that
social institutions can a¤ect the proportion of agents who possess the attribute, and a
fortiori, average income.
We return to the productive attribute case, but allow parents to purchase the at-
tribute for their children if they did not inherit it. We …rst modify the process by which
a new generation inherits the attribute from the previous generation. We assume that
if both parents have the attribute, both children inherit the attribute with probability
2p < 1 and if one parent has the attribute, both children inherit the attribute with
probability p: This speci…cation ensures that the proportion of people in any generation
who inherit theattribute is 2p times the proportion ofpeoplein the previous generation
that had the attribute.12 If no couples purchase the attribute for their children, the
attribute asymptotically disappears from the population.
In addition to the possibility of inheriting the attribute, we allow parents to make
investments that allow their children to acquire the attribute with positive probability
in the event that the child does not inherit the attribute. Speci…cally, we assume that
if o¤spring do not inherit the attribute, they obtain the attribute with probability q if
parents pay a cost c(q), where c0(q) ¸ 0 and c00(q) > 0, and c0(0) = 0. Parents must
fund the investments from current income. The choice of expenditure on attribute is
made after the realization of whether the child has inherited the attribute from his or
her parents. As before, agents with the attribute have probability 1
2 +k of having high
income and those without the attribute have probability 1
2 ¡k.
We areinterested in theproportion of parents who purchaseeducation in any period
in a stationary equilibrium, and in how that proportion is a¤ected by matching. We
provideconditionsunderwhichthevalueoftheattributeishigherundermixedmatching
than under assortative matching. When the value of the attribute is higher, all parents
whose children did not inherit the attribute will invest more to increase the probability
that their o¤spring will acquirethe attribute, and consequently, theproportion with the
attribute will be higher. Since the attribute is productive this implies that aggregate
income will be higher under mixed matching than under assortative matching.
We …rst describe the steady state under assortative matching. In this case, Hn
agents do not match with Ly agents; hence, the value of having the attribute is in-
dependent of the proportion of people in the population with the attribute, and so of
expenditures on the attribute by other agents. As before, we denote the continuation
values of children with the attribute and without the attribute (prior to the realization
12Ifp =
1
2 and a proportion of parentsbounded away from 0 purchase the attribute, asymptotically, all
agents will have the attribute. Consequently, for reasons analogous to those outlined in the diseconomies-
of-scale case, mixed matching is not stable.
22of their income) by V A
y and V A
n . The bene…t to parents who purchase probability q of
acquiring the attribute for their children is then q(VA
y ¡V A
n ), and marginal bene…t is
(VA
y ¡V A
n ). For k > 0, the marginal bene…t is strictly positive. The marginal cost to
parents is the marginal utility of forgone consumption. Hence, for a couple with total
income2H, themarginal cost is U0(2H ¡c(q))c0(q). Thisexpression isclearly increasing
in q, and the couple’s optimal q, denoted qA
HH, solves
(1 ¡ﬂ)U0(2H ¡c(q))c0(q) =ﬂ(V A
y ¡VA
n ):
Similarly, the optimal purchases for families with one high and onelow income (if there
were any) satis…es
(1 ¡ﬂ)U0(H +L ¡c(qA
HL))c0(qA
HL) = ﬂ(V A
y ¡V A
n );







xy denotes the optimal q for a couple whose respective incomes are x and y: It




















Just asin theproductiveexogenousattributecase, assortative matching may ormay
not be stable.
Consider now mixed matching. Under mixed matching, the values of having the
attribute are no longer independent of the proportion of people in the population who
have the attribute. With mixed matching, an Hn agent matches with an Ly agent if
possible. The “if possible” modi…er is necessary since there may not be equal numbers
of the two types. When there are more of one than another, some of those on the long
side of the market will not be able to participate in a mixed match, and instead will be
matched with others of the same type as themselves.
We are interested in understanding when each of the di¤erent matchings is an equi-
librium. For mixed matching to be an equilibrium, it must be in the interests of the
Hn and Ly agents to match with each other. The incentive constraints for each type of
agent to prefer this match to a match with a partner of the same type will depend on
the proportion of agents with the attribute, and the expenditures the di¤erent matches
will makeon theattribute should their children not inherit theattribute. We …rst state
the following proposition that there are steady state proportions and expenditures; the
proof of the proposition is left to the appendix.
23Proposition 8 Let „y be the fraction of the population with the attribute, and qM
‘ ,
‘ 2 fHH;HL; LLg, be the probability that income pair ‘ has purchased, assuming mixed








As for assortative matching, we still need to address the stability of mixed match-
ing. We next present two examples in which mixed matching is stable with productive
attributes. In the …rst example, assortative matching is also stable and gives a lower
per capita income than mixed matching, while it is not stable in the second.
Example 1 The cost function is c(q) =ﬁq2 and k =0. Since k = 0, under assortative
matching, no agents will purchase a positive probability of their children acquiring the
attribute. We denote by „A
y (0) the proportion of agents who have the attribute under
assortative matching when k equals 0; since p < 1
2; „A
y (0) =0:
Ifmixedmatchingisstable, theattributehasvalueand, becausec0(0) = 0; all couples
whose children have not inherited the attribute will purchase positive probabilities of
their children acquiring the attribute. The proportion of agents who have the attribute
under mixed matching when k equals 0; „M
y (0), is strictly positive.
Mixed matching may not, however, be stable. For example, if it is very inexpensive
forcouplesto purchasetheattribute, an Hn agent will prefer to match with anotherHn
agent anduse the additional family incometo purchasehigh probability ofacquiring the
attribute to getting probability p of children having the attribute by matching with an
Ly agent. However, for su¢ciently high ﬁ; matching with an Ly agent will bemore cost
e¤ective for an Hn agent to secure a given probability of o¤spring with the attribute
than relying on the “after market.”
To summarize, ifﬁ is su¢ciently high and k = 0, both positiveassortativematching
and mixed matching will be stableand „M
y >„A
y =0: Furthermore, it is easy to seethat
„M
y is larger for larger p since larger p implies a higher expected number of descendants
who will have the attribute.
The value functions V M
y and V M
n are continuous in k at k = 0: Consequently, if the
incentive constraints for mixed matching to be stable are satis…ed with strict inequality
when k = 0, they will still be satis…ed for k small enough. Thus, if mixed matching is
stable with strict inequalities on matching for k = 0; mixed matching will be stable for
positive, but small, k: Since V M
y , VM
n , V A
y and V A
n are continuous in k at k =0, „A
y (¢)
and „M
y (¢) arecontinuous; hence, for k small, „A
y (¢) < „M
y (¢): In words, moreagentshave
theproductiveattributeundermixed matching than under assortativematching. In the
case of nonproductive attributes, the matching a¤ected the distribution of income in
thesociety, but not theaggregateincome. Forthe productive example described above,
matching a¤ects both the total societal income and its distribution.
It is easy to see why mixed matching leads to greater number of agents with the
attribute by looking at the problem facing a couple whose child has not inherited the
24attribute, maxq(1¡ﬂ)U(l¡c(q))+qﬂ(Vy ¡Vn) (l is the pair’s combined income). The







n ); S 2 fA;Mg:
The left hand side is the marginal utility cost of q, while the right hand side is the
marginal bene…t. The marginal bene…t is close to 0 under assortative matching when
k is small, but bounded away from 0 for small k under mixed matching due to the
“social” bene…ts of the attribute (i.e., the insurance bene…ts the attribute provides).
The greater marginal value of the attribute under mixed matching naturally leads to
higher investment in the attribute.
As noted, this example is driven by the higher marginal value of the attribute in
the mixed matching equilibrium than in the assortative matching equilibrium, and the
attendant higher investments that result from this. We now present a second example
in which mixed matching is stable, while assortative is not.
Example 2 We…rst considertheincentiveconstraintsdescribinga mixed pairing under
either assortative or mixed matching (these should be satis…ed for the mixed match-
ing to be stable, and one must be violated for the assortative matching to be sta-
ble). Fix a matching, assortative or mixed, and let Vy (Vn) denoted the expected
utility of an agent with (without) the attribute under that matching. Children from
an HnLy match acquire the attribute in two ways: they either inherit the attribute
with probability p, or failing to inherit, their parents invest c(qHL) toward this end.
Thus the (unconditional) probability that the o¤spring of matched pairs HnLy have
the attribute is p +(1¡p)qHL, which we denote by pHL: Analogously, we denote by
pLL = 2p +(1¡2p)qLL the (unconditional) probability that the o¤spring of matched
pairs LyLy have the attribute. An Hn agent prefers to match with an Ly agent if
pf(1 ¡ﬂ)U(H +L) +ﬂVyg+(1¡p)f(1¡ﬂ)U (H +L ¡c(qHL))
+ﬂ[qHLVy +(1 ¡qHLVn)]g
¸ (1¡ﬂ)U (2H ¡c(qHH))+ﬂ(qHHVy +(1¡qHH)Vn): (6.1)
Analogously, an Ly agent prefers matching with an Hn rather than another Ly agent if
pf(1 ¡ﬂ)U(H +L) +ﬂVyg+(1¡p)f(1¡ﬂ)U (H +L ¡c(qHL))
+ﬂ[qHLVy +(1 ¡qHLVn)]g






















ﬂ(pHL ¡qHH)(Vy ¡Vn) ¸ (1 ¡ﬂ)fU (2H ¡c(qHH))
¡[pU (H +L) +(1¡p)U (H +L ¡c(qHL))]g; (6.3)
while (6.2) yields
ﬂ (pHL ¡pLL)(Vy ¡Vn) ¸ (1 ¡ﬂ) f[2pU (2L) +(1 ¡2p)U (2L ¡c(qLL))]
¡[pU (H +L) +(1¡p)U (H +L ¡c(qHL))]g: (6.4)
Mixed matching is stable (and assortativematching unstable) if the two inequalities
(6.3) and (6.4) are satis…ed.
For this example, we assume L = 0, H >
p
(1¡p), and U0 (0) = 1, so that two
matched low income agents have no money to purchase the attribute, implying qLL = 0
and H ¡c(qHL) > 0. Fix "; · >0 small and assume the cost function satis…es
c(q) =
½
·q; q < p=(1 ¡p);
¹ c; q = 2p¡";
with c0 (2p¡") = 1, ¹ c < H, and c convex on [0; 2p ¡"]. These assumptions on the
cost function ensure that (for su¢ciently small ·, see below) the investment choices for
the matched pairs HL and HH satisfy the following inequality:
p
(1¡p)
<qHL <qHH <2p ¡": (6.5)
Note that these inequalities hold under both mixed and assortative matching. Conse-
quently,
pHL ¡pLL = p +(1¡p)qHL ¡2p
= (1¡p)qHL ¡p > 0;
and
pHL ¡qHH = p+(1¡p)qHL ¡qHH
> 2p ¡qHH >":
Hence, the left hand sides of the inequalities (6.3) and (6.4) are positive. Since
L = 0; and consequently qLL = 0, the right hand side of (6.4) equals (ignoring the
(1¡ﬂ) term)
U (0) ¡[pU (H)+(1¡p)U (H ¡c(qHL))] ;
which is negative, since U (H) >0 and U(¢) ¸ 0. This immediately gives us (6.4).
26Next consider (6.3). We …rst obtain a lower bound on Vy ¡Vn that is independent





f(VHy ¡VHn) +(VLy ¡VLn)g
+kf(VHy ¡VLy) +(VHn¡VLn)g
is nonnegative, so that any term can serve as a lower bound for Vy ¡Vn.
Suppose the matching under consideration is the mixed matching. The fraction of
thepopulation with theattribute „y in steady stateis bounded above by 4p(1¡p) (from
(6.5)). Notethat this bound is independent oftheutility function. Thustheprobability

















Thus, (6.3) is implied by
ﬂ"
1
2»pU (H) ¸U (2H ¡c(qHH)) ¡U (H ¡c(qHL)):
But this is clearly satis…ed by any utility function that displays su¢cient risk aversion.
It remains to provide the appropriate upper bound on · (to ensure qHL > p=(1 ¡p)).
The …rst order condition determining qHL is
(1¡ﬂ)c0 (qHL)U0 (H +c(qHL)) = ﬂ(Vy ¡Vn);






Turning to assortative matching, observe that
Vy ¡Vn ¸k (VHy ¡VLy) ¸k2p(1¡ﬂ)U (2H);





27To summarize, mixed matching is stable for this con…guration of cost function and
incomes in the example if the agents are su¢ciently risk averse. At the same time, if
the attribute is su¢ciently productive, the assortative matching is not stable. The cost
function in the second examplewasdeliberately chosen to have a particular“threshold”
form: the cost of acquiring the attribute was relatively low until a point at which it
increased steeply. These characteristics of the cost function guarantee that HL couples
invest nearly as much as HH couples in the event that their o¤spring do not inherit
the attribute. On the other hand, be setting L very low (0 in the extreme case), LL
couples can invest little (or none) in the attribute. Under assortative matching, even
though there is no social value to the attribute, a mixed matching is pro…table because
the concavity of the utility function together with the structure of the cost function
imply that the short-run cost for an Hn agent of matching with an Ly is dominated by
the productiveness of the attribute.
7. Discussion
1. Related literature. Our earlierpapers, Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992)
and Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1998) (hereafter CMP), analyzes a growth model
incorporating matching between men and women. In that model, there are multiple
equilibria characterized by di¤erent matchings between men and women. The current
paper shares with thosepapers thefeaturethat di¤erent matching arrangementslead to
di¤erent economic choices – attribute choice in this paper and savings/bequests there.
As we indicated in the Introduction, in contrast to the model here, CMP is interested
in matching arrangements that can be supported using personalized punishments.13 ?
analyze a variant of the model in CMP in which each agent’s characteristics were not
perfectly observable to other agents. In addition to results similar to those in CMP,
Corneo and Jeanne show the possibility of societal segmentation in which agents are
a¤ected by the characteristics of only a subset of other agents. ? applies the principles
of themodel in this paperto investigatewhen thevalueoftradeable assets may depend
on the social institutions of a society.
? analyzes an overlapping generations model in which individuals can invest in a
social asset that he calls “culture”. Culture has no consumption value in itself, but has
positive external e¤ects on the growth rate of an economy. An individual learns culture
from an individual whocurrently hasculture, andwho charges to teachit. An individual
who invests in culture gets no direct bene…t, but is to be able to charge people in the
future who wish to invest in culture. In ? model, there is an opportunity cost to learn
culture in addition to the transfer to the teacher, and thus, theprice of culture must be
growing over time. There are equilibria in which culture has a constant price 0 and no
13Mailath and Postlewaite (2003) discussion these papers in more detail.
28one invests in it, but in addition there may be equilibria with “culture bubbles”, that
is, equilibria in which culture has a positivevalue, increasing over time. Theincrease in
the price of culture is sustainable because wageincomes rise over time, which in turn is
linked to the technological innovations that aregenerated as an externality of culture. If
in some generation no one bought culture, technological progress would cease, and the
growth rate of the economy would decrease. The social asset in ? di¤ers qualitatively
from ours in that it has direct productive value. While any single individual does not
bene…t from theasset in hismodel, thereis a higherrateofgrowthin economies inwhich
people invest in culture than in economies without such investment. In particular, the
culture could not have positive value in ? if it did not lead to technological progress.
Fang (2001) analyzes a model in which nonproductive attributes can have value in
equilibrium because agents have imperfectly observed ability. Fang demonstrates that
high ability agentsmay acquirea costly nonproductiveasset that (in equilibrium) serves
as a signal even though the cost of acquiring the attribute is independent of ability.
Social assets play an entirely di¤erent role in our model as there is no asymmetric
information, hence no role for signalling.
2. We have analyzed a model in which there is an interaction between the social
environment and agents’ decisions. Di¤ering social institutions can lead to di¤erences
in important economic decisions, and, conversely, agents decisions have important con-
sequences for the stability of the social institutions. Many of the insights the model
generates stem from the multiplicity of equilibria. Of course, this is not the …rst paper
to point to the importance of multiple equilibria characterized by di¤erent economic
choices by agents. Diamond (1970), for example, demonstrated the link between di¤er-
ent equilibria and the level of aggregate economic activity. Thenature of multiplicity in
this paper, however, di¤ers in an important way. Diamond’s multiplicity stems from a
complementarity intheproductiontechnology: eachagent haslittleincentivetoproduce
when few other agents produce. There is no analogous production complementarity in
our model: in the productive attribute case, the productive value of the attribute is in-
dependent ofthesocial institutions. The social value, however is not independent of the
institutions. Hence, the economic consequences of the multiplicity in our model result
from a change in the social return to the attribute rather than through the technology.
3. The example we have analyzed in some detail focuses on income uncertainty
and insurance as the conduit through which an asset may have social value. Our point
is more general, and to illustrate this, we now describe a simple non-matching example
in which a nonproductive attribute can have social value.
In the example, there are overlapping generations of lawyers, each lawyer living two
periods. There is a single nonstorable good over which lawyers have identical utility
29functions, u(c1;c2) = c1 ¢ c2, where ci is consumption at age i. There is a continuum
of lawyers born in each period indexed by i 2 [0;2]. Each young lawyer generates
an output of 2 in his …rst period but di¤er in their output in period 2. In period 2,
lawyer i can produce i: Each lawyer can go into practice on his own and consume his
own output, which generates total utility 2i for lawyer i. Alternatively, a new lawyer
can apprenticehimself to a “white-shoe” lawyer, who in addition to being a lawyer, has
social skills.14 The social skills haveno usein and ofthemselves, but can be transmitted
to others. Each white-shoe lawyer can take on at most 1 apprentice, and a fraction ﬁ
of the lawyers are white shoe. At the beginning of each period, each young lawyer who
had apprenticed himself to a white shoe lawyer in the previous period becomes a white
shoe lawyer himselfand makes an o¤er of an apprenticeship to a new lawyer. Theo¤ers
are take it or leave it o¤ers which will be accepted by young lawyers if and only if their
utility will be higher from accepting the o¤er than rejecting the o¤er and practicing on
their own. If a second period white shoe lawyer is able to hire an apprentice for a wage
w · 2 (the output of all young lawyers), the older lawyer will have a pro…t of 2 ¡w
from the younger lawyer, in addition to his own output.
Considersteady state outcomes, wherethefraction of white-shoelawyers isconstant
at ﬁ. Sinceeach old lawyer can takeonexactly oneapprentice, a fraction ﬁoftheyoung
lawyers must accept apprenticeships. Clearly, a wage o¤er of 2 yields an equilibrium in
which thesocial skills haveno value, all young lawyers areindi¤erent between accepting
and rejecting the o¤ers, and all old white-shoe lawyers are indi¤erent between success-
fully hiring an apprentice. Consider now a wage of w = ﬁ. We claim that all young
lawyers i · ﬁ will accept the o¤ers, and the remainder reject. If a young lawyer with
index i accepts the o¤er, his income will be ﬁ in period 1 and his income in period 2
from his apprentice will be 2¡ﬁ (output of 2 less wage of ﬁ). His own output is i (his
index), hencehis total income in period 2 is 2¡ﬁ+i, yielding a utility of ﬁ(2 ¡ﬁ+i).
If he rejects the apprenticeship, his income will be 2 in the …rst period and i in the
second period, which yields utility 2i. Hence, young lawyer i accepts the o¤er if and
only if i · ﬁ.
Thus, there exist qualitatively di¤erent equilibria for this problem. First, there is
an equilibrium in which the social skills that is the mark of a white-shoe lawyer has no
value. In addition, there is an equilibrium in which social skills have value, and this
equilibrium Pareto dominates the equilibrium in which the social skills have now value.
In this example, social value is not driven by risk aversion since there is no uncer-
tainty. Rather, it is driven by the desire to transfer consumption from the …rst period
of an agent’s life to the second period. As in the model we analyzed, missing markets
are key. This example is similar to ? model in that individuals make an investment
14The phrase “white-shoe” refers to the white buck shoes that were a fashion requirement within U.S.
elite social organizations in the 1950’s.
30in learning the social skills that constitute being a white-shoe lawyer, which they can
then sell to another lawyer in the future. Our example di¤ers from ? model in that
the social skills that are the social asset in the example truly have no productive value.
The output of every lawyer in every generation is independent of whether there are
any white-shoe lawyers or not.This example also highlights the connection to models
of money, since the social skills play the role of a record device, similar to money as
memory as described by Kocherlakota (1998).
4. There is a large literature arguing that institutions such as a functioning legal
system and respected property rightscan usefully be thought ofexamples ofsocial capi-
tal; morespeci…cally, social capital is typically viewed as a “community-level attribute”
(Putnam (1994), Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote (2001)). From a formal perspective,
social capital is best viewed as a characteristic of equilibrium in an in…nite horizon
game. The social norms as described in Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995) and
Kandori (1992) are prototypical examples. A common feature is that the incentives in
theseequilibria require the punishment ofdeviators. Consequently, equilibria exhibiting
social capital will not be “Markov.”
In contrast, the equilibria we study are Markov. While the particular matching
structure (e.g., mixed or assortative) could be thought as an instance of social capital,
we think it is useful to distinguish between social institutions which are necessarily
sustained by sanctions (which we would term social capital) and those which do not
require sanctions. As we noted in the previous point, the stability of both the mixed
and assortative matching is driven by anonymous considerations: the attribute has a
certain value (which may be zero) and it is irrelevant how that attribute was acquired.
5. Themixed matching equilibrium is reminiscent ofsomeversions ofthe theory of
sexual selection (Ridley (1993)). These theories have been motivated by the existence
of animals such as peacocks. A nontrivial amount of the peacock’s biological resources
are invested in long and elegant tail feathers, which serve no productive purpose. Since
natural selection selects for the …ttest peacocks (those with shorter tails), there is a
puzzle. Why do peahens prefer less …t males (those who have devoted scarce resources
to feathers), as they must in order for theless…t males to dominatethepopulation? The
explanation is similar to the logic of the stability of the mixed matching in our model.
Suppose peahens prefer long-tailed peacocks; then so long as long tails are genetically
transmitted to maleo¤spring, themale o¤spring ofa peahen matched with a long-tailed
mate will farebetter in the market for mates in the next generation. Hence, there is an
advantage to peahens that match with long-tailed peacocks that o¤sets the resources
associated with long tails.
Peacocks’ long tail feathers are similar to social assets in our model, but the in-
31centives associated with the matching di¤er. A peahen that mates with a short-tailed
peacock will havemore o¤spring that survive. However, whilea peahen that mates with
a long-tailed matemay havefewer surviving o¤spring, the maleo¤spring will themselves
have more surviving o¤spring due to the advantage long tails confer in the matching
process. Thus, selection, which is driving the peahen’s choice of mates, is essentially
balancing between the genetic advantage of more surviving o¤spring in the next gen-
eration and more surviving o¤spring in the subsequent generation. In our model, by
contrast, a rich person without an attribute considering matching with a poor person
with the attribute is balancing current consumption against descendants’ consumption.
8. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3. Since k = 0, the attribute has no value under assortative
matching, and so VA
y = VA
n = 1
2. Hence, the utility of a high income agent with the
attribute, V A











and theutility ofa low incomeagent withtheattribute, V A
Ly, equals that ofa low income








Under mixed matching, an Hy matches with a similar agent, consumes 2H and has
two children, each of whom has attribute y. Hence, the utility of such an agent is
V M
Hy = 1¡ﬂ +ﬂVM
y :
Similarly, an Ln agent will match with an agent of the same type, consume 2L and




Finally, Hn agents and Ly agents will have the same utility, since they are matched
with each other and jointly consume H +L and have children that are equally likely to
have attribute y or n. Denoting their utility by V M
m , we have
V M






32Solving (3.2) and (3.3) when k =0 yields
V M
y =
















































































That is, Hn agentsandLy agentshave(weakly) higherutility under mixedmatching
than under assortativematching if, and only if, (3.8) holds. Since VM
Hy >V M
m , Hy agents
have strictly higher utility under mixed matching when (3.8) holds.

















33Proof of Proposition 8. We de…ne a mapping © : [0; 1]
4 ! [0;1]
4 with the
property that stationary valuesof
¡
„y;qM¢




is the fraction of the population that will have the attribute
next period if thecurrent population has fraction „y and parents purchase according to
qM: Therearetwo casesweneed to deal with, „y · 1
2 and „y < 1
2. Supposethat „y ¸ 1
2,
so that thereare at least as many Ly as Hn agents. Thefraction ofthepopulation with
















































































On the other hand, if „y < 1














































































Clearly, ©1 is continuous.
In order to de…ne ©2, we …rst need to a calculate a value for the attribute, given „y
and qM. In this calculation, it is important to note that weare not requiring that „y be
consistent with qM (though at the …xed point, they will be consistent). Denote by ~ Vi




in each period. Then, setting

























































Moreover, if „y ¸ 1
2 (the reverse inequality is an obvious modi…cation), we have
~ VHn = p
n














































































Theseequations have a unique solution. Moreover, this solution is continuous in „y and
qM.













(1¡ﬂ)U (‘ ¡c(q)) +ﬂ
³
q~ Vy +(1¡q) ~ Vn
´
:
35Themaximizeris uniquesinceU is concaveand cisstrictly convex. Sincethemaximizer
is unique, it is a continuous function of
¡
„y;qM¢
, through the continuity of ~ Vy and ~ Vn.
Since © is a continuous function on a compact convex subset of <4, there is a
…xed point by Brouwer. Note also that in the …xed point, ~ Vy > ~ Vn: Suppose that
~ Vy · ~ Vn. Optimization then implies qM
‘ = 0 for all ‘. But then „y = 0 (since p < 1
2),
and so ~ Vn = 1
2 ¡ k (recall our normalization U(2L) = 0). Moreover, if ~ Vy · ~ Vn,
~ Vy >(1¡ﬂ)f1
2 +k +(1
2 ¡k)ug +ﬂ ~ Vy (where U(H +L) = u), contradicting ~ Vy · ~ Vn.
Since we have assumed c0(0) = 0, qM
‘ > 0 for all ‘ and so „y > 0. Note also that
„y < 1: For suppose „y = 1, then a fraction 1
2 ¡ k of agents are Ly’s and since
2p +(1¡2p)qM
LL <1, not all the population in the next period can have the attribute.
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